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Abstract 
Author: Tommy Sinnes 
Supervisor: Tor Endestad 
Title: Temporal binding of action and its consequences – Stimulus-identity prediction and 
neural correlates. 
 
For over a decade, it has been known that intended actions and their sensory consequences are 
judged as occurring closer together in time than otherwise equivalent non-intended actions 
and their effects. This phenomenon, known as temporal binding, has been argued to represent 
a sense of agency and to be the result of motor-predictive mechanisms underlying voluntary 
action. It has further been demonstrated that such binding can be affected by learning. Based 
on these findings, I here build on the motor-predictive framework and complementary 
theories of learning and argue for a central role for prediction error in temporal binding. A 
computational framework for estimating on-line task-irrelevant predictions in a binding task is 
proposed and tested on 17 participants while they are simultaneously undergoing functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). It was hypothesised that predictions would be positively 
associated with degree of binding while the actual outcome would interact with the prediction 
and form a negative association in terms of increased prediction error. I further speculated that 
the degree of prediction error would be represented by neural activity in areas more 
commonly associated with reinforcement learning. The behavioural analysis showed that 
prediction error was significantly predictive of decreased binding, as hypothesised, but no 
significant independent contribution of the prediction regardless of outcome was found. For 
the fMRI analysis, no significant activation was found to be related to prediction error or the 
prediction itself. However, a second analysis looking for correlations with binding measures 
revealed negatively correlated activation in the precuneus and left upper brain-stem. The 
results are discussed in light of the binding measure currently used and a potential role for the 
default-mode network in agency. It is concluded that task-irrelevant learning of stimulus-
identity seems to occur in temporal binding, and seems driven by prediction error. It is, 
however, still unknown how this is implemented in neural terms. Because the current study 
fails to replicate an earlier finding regarding neural correlates of temporal binding, a 
continued investigation of this is encouraged, as well as further studies on how different 
binding measures relate to agency and voluntary action.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Agency, mechanisms of motor control, and the experience of 
time 
 
“It is still open for me, as well as you, to regulate my behavior, by my experience of 
past events.” (Hume, 1758, p. 361) 
 
As human agents we enjoy the ability to influence our environment through our 
actions, allowing us to achieve desired future states in relation to that environment. Such an 
ability requires modelling of the environment (Conant & Ross Ashby, 1970), which in turn 
requires information to be gathered regarding the models success or failure in order for it to 
adapt according to environmental changes. If a change occurs, it must be known whether the 
change could be attributed to the agent. In other words, some inference about causality 
between the agent and the environmental change needs to be made. This involves the 
inference that ‘the action caused the effect’, and, perhaps more fundamentally, the inference 
that ‘I caused the action’. The ability to refer to oneself as the author one’s own actions, has 
been regarded the defining feature of the human sense of agency (de Vignemont & Fourneret, 
2004), which further involves an experience of coherence between the intended action and its 
perceived consequence. As has been shown quite recently, this experienced coherence seems 
not to be merely an abstract experience, but seems to manifest itself in very concrete 
perceptual terms where the action and its consequence are actually perceived as being bound 
together in time (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002), a finding that will shortly be discussed 
in more detail. Intuitively, it may thus seem as (experienced) agency, motor control and the 
perception of time are closely related phenomena. 
Before proceeding with a more detailed discussion of the binding phenomenon, it 
should be noted that there is a fundamental problem in measuring subjective time in that the 
experienced time has to be reported after the occurrence of the event, necessarily involving 
both perceptual and recollective processes. Findings of reliable differences in such reports, 
e.g. between conditions in an experiment, could thus be due to recollection bias as well as an 
actual change in perception. The binding phenomenon, that involves a reported shortening of 
the interval between action and effect, has nevertheless been thought to be the result of a 
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direct influence on perception (e.g. Haggard et al., 2002), similarly to the process of inferring 
causality in visual perception (Körding et al., 2007; Scholl & Nakayama, 2002; Scholl & 
Tremoulet, 2000). This assumption follows largely from findings linking binding specifically 
to voluntary action (Haggard, 2005), which in turn implies a central involvement of 
mechanisms underlying motor control. Some understanding of these mechanisms is thus 
required. 
1.1.1 Motor control and sensory processing 
One of the most influential computational frameworks of the neuroscience of 
voluntary action (Wolpert, 1997; Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000) holds that this is governed by 
‘internal models’ modelling the sensorimotor system, of which there are three types: ‘inverse 
models’, ‘forward dynamic models’, and ‘forward sensory models’. Specifically, this 
framework states that, given the state of the sensorimotor system in combination with a task 
to be executed, a motor command is specified (inverse model). The expected change in the 
sensorimotor state is then computed from the motor command (forward dynamic model) and 
specific sensory predictions are generated given this expected state (forward sensory model) 
(fig. 1). The difference between predicted and actual sensory feedback provides an error 
signal that can be used to update the model. In this way, new associations between desired 
sensory outcomes and the actions required to generate them, can be learned. The internal 
sensory predictions are further considered a central component of our normal experience of 
control or agency. Here, predictions are thought to be compared with actual sensory 
consequences and a sense of agency arises as a result of how well they are matching. This 
explanatory framework has been termed the ‘comparator model’ and has been used to explain 
normal action awareness (Blakemore, 2009), as well as delusions of control (Blakemore, 
Wolpert, & Frith, 2002; Frith, 2012). Such a sense of agency is important because it allows 
differentiating between sensory changes that are caused by the agent and changes that are 
externally generated. The internal sensory predictions are thought to affect the perceptual 
system directly, resulting in phenomena like ‘sensory attenuation’, where sensations are 
experienced as less intense after being predicted by motor processes (e.g. Bays, Flanagan, & 
Wolpert, 2006; Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2000; Cardoso-Leite, Mamassian, Schütz-
Bosbach, & Waszak, 2010; Voss, Ingram, Haggard, & Wolpert, 2006). Direct evidence for 
such modulation of the sensory system has been provided (Hughes & Waszak, 2011; Shergill 
et al., 2013) and has been explained in terms of ‘preactivation’ of sensory activity (Roussel, 
Hughes, & Waszak, 2013). Sensory prediction has also been linked to explicit agency 
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judgments in experimental studies (Sato, 2009; Sato & Yasuda, 2005), supporting its role in 
generating a sense of agency.  
Because the phenomenon of temporal binding has been observed in close relation to 
voluntary actions, it has been assumed that internal sensory predictions are correlated with the 
phenomenon, and it has therefore been suggested that they are actually causing it. Since these 
sensory predictions are occurring before the actual sensation is experienced and involve 
processes in the perceptual system, it is thought that temporal binding could also be a 
perceptual phenomenon. The sensory effect component of the action-effect interval has 
specifically been explained in terms of sensory preactivation (Desantis, Hughes, & Waszak, 
2012): The sensation is evoked before its generative external event actually occurs, and is 
therefore more readily experienced and appears to occur earlier in time than what is actually 
the case. 
 
 
Figure 1. The stages defining the process of generating movement. The model involves 
continuous updating through a specific mechanism which is not illustrated here, but occurs 
through the use of the above described components. The figure is based on Wolpert and 
Ghahramani (2000). 
 
The assumed importance of motor prediction in binding does of course not rule out the 
possibility of an involvement of recollective processes, it merely states the potential for 
predictions to affect perception during voluntary generated action-effects. With this in mind, 
it should also be noted that alternative models of experienced motor control holds that the 
experience of motor control or agency is essentially a reconstruction of likely causation that is 
Inverse 
model 
Forward 
dynamic model 
Forward 
sensory 
model 
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happening after the perceived influence of action (Wegner, 2003). However, the potential 
involvement of postdictive processes does not necessarily imply high-level cognition either, 
since it has been shown that such postdictive factors can actually influence low-level 
perception (e.g. Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2000; Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2003) and that it can 
also affect causal perception (Choi & Scholl, 2006). 
More recently, an alternative account of action and perception has emerged based on 
hierarchical Bayesian inference (Friston, 2010; Friston, Kilner, & Harrison, 2006). From this, 
it is argued that both action and perception arises out of the same principle of trying to 
minimise discrepancy between sensory evidence and predictions (Adams, Shipp, & Friston, 
2013; Friston, Daunizeau, Kilner, & Kiebel, 2010), and further, that the same principles 
underlies intentions and understanding of other peoples actions (Friston, Mattout, & Kilner, 
2011; Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007). I will be returning to this subject of minimising 
discrepancy, or prediction error, later. 
Taken together, theories and empirical findings related to mechanisms of motor 
control suggest a central role for sensory prediction in action and perception. These 
predictions are further thought to be fundamentally involved in generating a sense of agency. 
The idea that time perception could be equally affected by these same principles underlying 
motor control, paves the way for the intriguing possibility that the experience of coherence, or 
tieing-together, associated with agency experience could have a clear perceptual basis. It 
follows easily from this, that further understanding of the common mechanisms underlying 
these phenomena could have the potential to shed new light on the phenomenology of agency. 
Furthermore, this is not merely of philosophical interest, but is thought to be of special 
importance in understanding abnormalities in the experience of agency. For patients 
diagnosed with schizophrenia there are not necessarily obvious problems with basic motor 
control, but still they frequently report subjective experiences of vastly excessive control or a 
complete lack of control when this is evidently not the case. Keeping this motor control 
framework in mind, I will now turn to more specific findings on the variability of experienced 
time of action-effect intervals. 
1.2 Temporal binding of action and sensory consequence 
1.2.1 The intentional binding effect – intention, causality or agency? 
The finding that voluntary actions and their sensory consequences are perceived as 
temporally shifted together in time was first demonstrated in a study by Haggard et al. (2002). 
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By watching a rotating clock and pushing a button at a time of their choosing, participants 
reported either the time of their button press or a resulting tone, following 250 ms after the 
action. The reported times were compared with judgments of equivalent actions and tones 
occurring alone. In a separate condition, involuntary muscle twitches were induced by 
applying transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to the motor cortex. These twitches were 
also followed by tones, and both components were judged in the same manner as in the 
voluntary condition and compared with twitches and tones occurring alone. Additionally, a 
separate sham TMS condition was included involving similar comparisons. For both the 
voluntary and involuntary action condition, the judgments were significantly different when 
action and tone occurred in sequence. However, they showed opposite patterns of temporal 
shifts. Whereas the action in the voluntary condition was perceived as occurring later in time, 
the action in the involuntary condition was perceived as occurring earlier. The opposite 
pattern was demonstrated for tone judgments in the voluntary and involuntary condition. 
Based on these findings, it was argued that the temporal binding of actions and effects is 
specific to intentionally generated actions and was therefore termed ‘the intentional binding 
(IB) effect’. It was further speculated that the phenomenon represents a construction of a 
coherent conscious experience of agency by binding intentional actions to their effects. In a 
subsequent study, the effect was also demonstrated when participants were observing other 
peoples intended actions, compared with machine-generated actions (Wohlschläger, Haggard, 
Gesierich, & Prinz, 2003), supporting an involvement of intention. 
The assumption that intention, and not a more general condition of causality, was the 
crucial ingredient underlying IB was however soon challenged (Eagleman & Holcombe, 
2002). The importance of perceived causality for IB to occur has been supported by more 
recent empirical studies (Buehner, 2012; Buehner & Humphreys, 2009). However, Moore and 
Obhi (2012) and Cravo, Claessens, and Baldo (2009) have argued for both causality and 
voluntary action being necessary for the effect to occur. Nonetheless, the phenomenon of 
action-effect binding will in the following be referred to using the more neutral term temporal 
binding (TB), not implying a necessary involvement of intention. 
Regardless of true intentionality being a necessary component of TB, it has been 
assumed that the binding phenomenon has a special relation to the experience of agency 
(Moore & Obhi, 2012). In fact, this assumption has been so strong that several studies have 
used TB as an indirect measure of sense of agency (e.g. Demanet, Muhle-Karbe, Lynn, 
Blotenberg, & Brass, 2013; Engbert, Wohlschläger, & Haggard, 2008; Kühn, Brass, & 
Haggard, 2013). Importantly, this experience could represent true agency resulting from 
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motor-predictive processes, but it could equally represent a false inference of agency based on 
postdictive factors.  
1.2.2 Predictive mechanisms in TB 
Because of its apparent link to voluntary, intended actions, the TB effect was early 
hypothesised to be a consequence of sensory predictions resulting from forward sensory 
models during action (Haggard et al., 2002). Consistent with this hypothesis, there has been 
found evidence of altered binding in patients with schizophrenia (Haggard, Martin, Taylor-
Clarke, Jeannerod, & Franck, 2003; Voss et al., 2010), a patient group in which the disrupted 
sense of agency has previously been argued as resulting from abnormalities in internal 
forward models (Blakemore et al., 2002). This hypothesis of abnormalities in action 
awareness in schizophrenia has received additional evidence in recent years (Lindner, Thier, 
Kircher, Haarmeier, & Leube, 2005; Synofzik, Thier, Leube, Schlotterbeck, & Lindner, 2010; 
Williams, Ramachandran, Hubbard, Braff, & Light, 2010). 
 Looking for experimental evidence of such predictive mechanisms in binding, Tsakiris 
and Haggard (2003) replicated the intentional binding effect for a somatosensory 
consequence, and showed in a separate experiment that the same consequence also was 
perceived as less intense when occurring after a voluntary action, in line with the sensory 
attenuation effect previously described. This is indicative of sensory predictive mechanisms 
operating during a binding task, but does not imply a causal relationship between the two. As 
a continuation of the initial investigations into TB, Haggard and Clark (2003) further 
demonstrated that TB is decreased when an intention is disrupted by an involuntary 
movement, even though it is followed by the same sensory effect, implying that retrospective 
inference is not sufficient as an explanation of the phenomenon, and that internally generated 
predictions are crucial. 
 In further support of predictive mechanisms, it has been shown that priming of effect 
increases binding when the prime is congruent with the effect (Moore, Wegner, & Haggard, 
2009). This effect of priming was found for both voluntary and involuntary action-effect 
relations, but was actually strongest for involuntary actions. Such an influence is also 
consistent with the view that TB relates to experience of agency, as this experience has also 
been found to be influenced by priming (Aarts, Custers, & Wegner, 2005). 
The sensory prediction view on TB was, however challenged quite recently, in a paper 
by Desantis et al. (2012). There, it was pointed out that previous studies had not made 
sufficient distinctions between all relevant variables and that conclusions regarding TB effects 
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due to specific sensory predictive processes were not warranted. An experiment was described 
where the effect of identity-specific predictions on TB was separated from factors like 
motoric control of the onset of the stimulus. A classic TB effect was demonstrated, but no 
specific effect was found for the ability to predict exact stimulus-identity. It was then 
concluded that specific sensory prediction plays no role in TB. Because of importance for the 
assumptions from which the current study is designed, this claim should be commented 
further. 
There are some critical comments that could be made regarding this finding. First, the 
study assessed binding using an indirect approach (see later paragraph ‘Measuring temporal 
binding’ for further explanation) and in so doing, only considered the temporal shift of the 
action-effect. This was chosen because it was thought to be more dependent on predictive 
processes than the action, based on a previous report that showed effect of pre-SMA 
stimulation on effect, but not action judgments (Moore, Ruge, Wenke, Rothwell, & Haggard, 
2010). However, we do not know whether a direct interval measure would have produced 
different results. Second, the study reports on a failure to reject the null hypothesis under 
classical inference and then draws conclusions about the truth of that hypothesis, which is 
strictly wrong (Gallistel, 2009; Wagenmakers, 2007). Still, the finding that TB seems to be 
driven by other factors like temporal control under those experimental circumstances should 
be considered important. With this in mind, perhaps the most central critique pertains to the 
fact that the study is built on the premise that sensory predictions resulting from forward 
models provide either a match or a no-match with respect to the output in a qualitative-like 
fashion. Specifically, it is claimed that “if predictive forward mechanisms drive binding, then 
it should only occur in situations in which the agent is able to predict the identity of the 
sensory event s/he is going to produce” (Desantis et al., 2012, p.1). In contrast, the 
discrepancy between predicted and actual sensory consequences are considered to be 
quantitative in nature (Blakemore, 2009) stated in terms of prediction error (Wolpert & 
Ghahramani, 2000). This matters because the sensory consequences used in the study of 
Desantis et al. (2012) are two tones, differing only in pitch. Under a forward model where 
neural representations of the predicted stimulus are compared against the actual stimulus 
representation, the instance where the predicted stimulus are completely absent should only be 
regarded as the most extreme violation of the prediction for that particular stimulus. An 
instance where the predicted stimulus is somewhat wrong could still be viewed as a quite 
close match. Thus, to have the best chance of getting an influence on TB from violations of 
predicted stimulus identity, the alternative identities should be as different as possible in terms 
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of evoked neural representations. The findings of Desantis et al. (2012) are therefore not 
considered convincing for rejecting a contribution of stimulus prediction in TB. 
Not only internal predictive mechanisms have been found to exert an effect on 
binding. It has been demonstrated that what is happening after the prediction, so-called 
postdictive factors, also play a significant role in influencing the magnitude of TB. An 
‘optimal cue integration model’ has been proposed by Moore et al. (2009) to explain the 
combined influence of motor signals and sensations evoked by external cues on TB (see also 
Moore & Fletcher, 2012). Some of the findings relating to the role of postdiction will now be 
reviewed from a learning perspective. 
1.2.3 Learning effects on TB 
An implication of forward models, or any model involving sensory prediction, is the 
potential for such predictions to be learnt. If such predictive mechanisms are involved in TB, 
one could expect that those mechanisms would indeed be under the influence of some 
learning process. 
 In line with this, Engbert and Wohlschläger (2007) found that binding of the action 
component was dependent on the probabilistic contingency between action and outcome 
irrespective of whether the outcome actually occurred, indicating that this probabilistic 
association was learnt and in turn affected TB. Similarly, Moore and Haggard (2008) 
demonstrated that when no outcome appeared, action binding was increased in a condition 
where expectancy regarding outcome was higher. Further, they showed that in a condition 
where occurrence of the stimulus was unpredictable, binding was increased when the stimulus 
did occur. Thus, it was argued that both predictive and retrospective mechanisms contribute to 
TB. Importantly, these findings imply that TB is not fixed due to some solely internal process, 
but are affected by external cues through both immediate corrections of likely causation and 
updating of future expectations. However, as pointed out by Desantis et al. (2012), the studies 
are concerned with prediction of stimulus occurrence, and not with prediction of the exact 
identity of the stimulus. 
 Of particular importance for the current study is the additional finding in the study of 
Moore and Haggard (2008) that the effect on binding in the prediction condition was 
modulated by recency of outcome. That is, when an action had recently produced an outcome, 
binding would be increased on subsequent trials. This indicates that predictions are 
continuously updated according to learning principles similar to those of basic associative 
learning. Such learning principles were investigated further by Moore, Dickinson, and 
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Fletcher (2011). Specifically, they measured binding for action-effect relations that had been 
previously trained under different levels of surprise and found increased binding when the 
surprise level had been higher during training. This indicates that surprise plays a role in 
establishing future expectations which in turn affects degree of binding. 
In a study by Aarts et al. (2012) it was found that priming people with positive, 
compared to neutral, pictures increased binding in a subsequent TB task. This was thought to 
be related to reward processing. Perhaps even more interesting, this effect was found to be 
mediated by the participants’ baseline eye-blink rate as measured by eye-tracking equipment. 
This was considered indicative of a potential role for dopamine in TB because of its presumed 
association with eye-blink rate (Karson, 1983;  but see also van der Post, de Waal, de Kam, 
Cohen, & van Gerven, 2004). More direct evidence for dopaminergic influence on TB was 
however provided by Moore, Schneider, et al. (2010) who demonstrated increased binding in 
patients with Parkinson’s disease when on dopaminergic medications compared with binding 
when off such medications. Since dopamine function is also altered in schizophrenia (e.g. 
Howes & Kapur, 2009; Toda & Abi-Dargham, 2007), one might further speculate on whether 
the previously mentioned findings of increased TB in these patients also relates to alterations 
in dopamine. Taken together, these findings provide an even stronger case for associative 
learning processes in TB given the central role of dopamine in basic reward learning (e.g. 
Wise & Rompre, 1989) and possibly also in the more general context of associative learning 
(Spanagel & Weiss, 1999). 
Even though a great amount of studies imply a role for learning in TB, there is a lack 
of studies investigating the specific mechanisms underlying such learning. Seeking to explore 
such learning mechanisms further, I here draw on previous success in modelling task-
irrelevant associative learning using a simple computational framework in combination with a 
temporal estimation task. 
1.3 A computational framework for on-line associative learning 
in TB 
1.3.1 The concept of prediction error in models of learning  
 From the TB studies reviewed, it is evident that some sort of learning mechanism is 
involved. Central to both classic models of associative learning (Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & 
Hall, 1980; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), as well as more recent generalised predictive coding 
models (Friston, 2010; Friston et al., 2006) and previously mentioned models of motor control 
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(Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000), is the concept of prediction error, or surprise. It is thought 
that learning only occurs when the outcome is surprising with regards to some prediction, that 
is, when there is an error in the stated prediction. More specifically, the prediction is updated 
according to the magnitude of prediction error. Given the aforementioned association between 
TB and dopamine, it is then particularly interesting that a central function of the dopamine 
system seems to be encoding of prediction errors during reinforcement learning (Bayer & 
Glimcher, 2005; Glimcher, 2011; Pessiglione, Seymour, Flandin, Dolan, & Frith, 2006; 
Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997). Similar prediction error signals has also been found in 
the striatum for non-rewarding and task-irrelevant learning of stimulus-stimulus associations 
(den Ouden, Friston, Daw, McIntosh, & Stephan, 2009), indicating a similar role for 
prediction errors in associative learning and adding to other findings of learnt task-irrelevant 
statistical associations (Turk-Browne, Jungé, & Scholl, 2005; Turk-Browne, Scholl, Chun, & 
Johnson, 2008; Turk-Browne, Scholl, Johnson, & Chun, 2010). Recent theoretical work based 
on the so-called ‘free-energy principle’ casts further doubt on the specificity of reinforcement 
learning (Friston, Daunizeau, & Kiebel, 2009), and redefines the role of dopamine 
accordingly (Friston et al., 2012). This is based on a previously mentioned hierarchical 
predictive coding model of the brain where it is thought that each level in the hierarchy seeks 
to explain input from lower levels by continuously minimising prediction error (Friston, 2010; 
Friston et al., 2006). Evidence for hierarchical prediction errors has recently been reported 
(Iglesias et al., 2013). 
Seemingly mirroring the link between abnormal TB and schizophrenia, patients 
suffering from psychosis have also been shown to have abnormal neural responses associated 
with reward prediction errors (Murray et al., 2007), and patient’s with Parkinson’s disease off 
dopaminergic medications have shown decreased responses to prediction error (Galea, 
Bestmann, Beigi, Jahanshahi, & Rothwell, 2012). 
Given that both TB and prediction error are related to learning, dopamine function and 
schizophrenia, a central role for prediction error signals in driving binding is assumed. 
Further, it is suspected that these signals might draw on the same mechanisms involved in 
classic reinforcement learning, and hence any associated neural activity might be suspected to 
overlap with neuroanatomical regions implicated in processing of reward. 
1.3.2 Measuring temporal binding 
TB have primarily been assessed using two different approaches (Moore & Obhi, 
2012). Following the methodology for measuring subjective time introduced by Libet (Libet, 
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Gleason, Wrigth, & Pearl, 1983), an indirect procedure was originally used, having 
participants watch a rotating clock-hand and report its position either when they pressed the 
button or when the effect appeared (Haggard et al., 2002). The interval judgments for each 
condition could then be estimated post hoc. Because of the limitations of this method (e.g. 
Humphreys & Buehner, 2009), a direct interval estimation method was later introduced to the 
field (Engbert, Wohlschläger, Thomas, & Haggard, 2007). This methodology simply involved 
having participants report the duration of the interval using a scale. 
Some limitations are associated with both procedures. In order to measure the entire 
action-effect interval at once, a direct estimation method has to be used. Using the indirect 
procedure therefore also requires twice the amount of trials in order to reconstruct the 
combined amount of binding resulting from the separately perceived shifts of action and 
effect. The direct estimation procedure however involves some sort of verbal report where 
intervals have to be reported using a measure of duration that can not be perceived directly. In 
other words, a transformation from the experienced time duration to a more abstract time 
scale is required. Even though the method has proven to reliably reproduce the TB effect 
(Engbert et al., 2007), this transformation could be expected to introduce additional noise in 
the measurements. Further, this method has employed only a few distinct alternating interval 
durations during the task, making the durations more easily predictable over time. Potentially 
overcoming these limitations, a direct estimation method based on reproduction was recently 
introduced by Poonian and Cunnington (2013) were the intervals varied randomly between 
500 ms and 1500 ms. Here, subjects reported the perceived interval length by simply 
reproducing the duration through pressing and holding down a button for the same amount of 
time as the perceived length. Such a motor-based report could be argued to be a much simpler 
and more experience-near way of reporting subjective time, as well as providing the 
opportunity for a higher degree of randomness from trial to trial, thereby reducing temporal 
control of stimulus onset (Desantis et al., 2012). 
1.3.3 On-line prediction error changes in TB? 
 An earlier study has shown that surprise affects later measurements of binding (Moore 
et al., 2011), but it is currently unknown whether prediction error has an on-line effect on TB 
in a linear fashion and, if so, how it actually relates to binding in terms of an increasing or 
decreasing effect. Even though indications of such prediction error effects have been provided 
through the modulating effect of recency of previous action-effect associations (Moore & 
Haggard, 2008), there have, to my knowledge, not been any attempts of relating moment-to-
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moment changes in prediction error to changes in TB at those same moments. Further, earlier 
studies have failed to test for effects of specific stimulus-identity predictions (Desantis et al., 
2012), which is a crucial implication of motor-predictive mechanisms (Wolpert & 
Ghahramani, 2000). I therefore aimed to further investigate the combined influence of 
prediction and the resulting outcome on TB for predictions that were only concerned with 
stimulus-identity. It was hypothesised that prediction errors would drive learning in terms of 
updating specific sensory predictions from the motor system, and that these would in turn 
affect the magnitude of TB depending on the actual outcome. It was suspected that the 
magnitude of prediction error would be negatively related to the magnitude of TB, as would 
be expected from a comparator model of agency experience. Because previous studies had 
shown an independent effect of expectation on TB (Engbert & Wohlschläger, 2007), it was 
further hypothesised that the prediction level would additionally affect TB regardless of the 
actual outcome. 
 In light of recent findings implicating reward processing neuroanatomical regions in 
learning statistical associations even in the absence of reward (den Ouden et al., 2009), it was 
thought that such regions might also be implicated in motor-prediction learning underlying 
TB. 
1.3.4 Combining prediction estimates and TB measures 
Attempting to investigate both the hypothesised impact of prediction errors and 
resulting predictions, as well as underlying neural activity, I set out to devise a TB task that 
would make possible characterisation of such predictions and errors together with 
measurements of neural activity. When seeking to investigate the role of stimulus prediction 
in TB, it is of utmost importance that the learning is irrelevant for performance of the TB task. 
Thus, it follows that the estimation of prediction changes can not be aided by behavioural 
measures. It was therefore sought to use a theoretical model to compute such predictions 
based on experimentally manipulated variables. The model would preferably have 
considerable empirical support and be simple, requiring few additional assumptions to be 
made. 
With these thoughts in mind, I adopted parts of the paradigm and procedure  used by 
den Ouden et al. (2009) in exploring the role of prediction error in incidental learning. An 
experiment was developed where participants were to freely choose one of two buttons to 
press, which then in turn was followed by a sensory effect. The length of the interval was then 
judged, similarly to other TB tasks. However, the button press was then set up to act as a cue 
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towards the identity of the effect. Following den Ouden et al. (2009), the probability of the 
two identities were otherwise identical, implying that the only way to reach above-chance 
predictions regarding the stimulus-identity was to rely on the action-cue. This was achieved 
by making sure participants made an equal amount of presses on each button while each 
button was probabilistically associated with the stimulus-identity in a mirrored fashion to the 
other button. As has been critically remarked previously in the study of TB (Desantis et al., 
2012), the hypothesised underlying predictive mechanisms, as specified by forward or 
predictive coding models, crucially implies stimulus-identity prediction. I therefore sought to 
devise a temporal judgment task were the action-effect would only differ in terms of a specific 
feature. Colour was chosen as the stimuli-distinguishing feature because of its ability to evoke 
visual neural activity (Beauchamp, Haxby, Jennings, & DeYoe, 1999). 
In terms of the specific model serving to estimate participants acquiring of predictions, 
I also chose the Rescorla-Wagner model (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), used successfully by 
den Ouden et al. (2009) to model incidental probabilistic learning. This model is considered a 
classic model of associative learning and has proven fairly accurate in modelling several 
simple learning phenomena (Miller, Barnet, & Grahame, 1995). The model was not chosen 
because it was considered to be the best model for stimulus prediction in TB, but because it 
was thought to be able to model some of the variation due to prediction error-driven learning. 
Importantly, if the model proves to capture some of the variation in TB, it should be equally 
capable of describing the effect of prediction level in combination with outcomes as the effect 
of prediction level regardless of outcome. Since prediction error is defined as the discrepancy 
between prediction and outcome, the combination of these two variables will define the 
degree of prediction error. Because the prediction will be defined with respect to the high-
probability outcome separately for both cues, the outcome on each trial will determine 
whether an increasing prediction value represents increasing or decreasing values of 
prediction error. I will be referring to these two characterisations of prediction error as 
increasing surprise and increasing expectancy, respectively. 
In order to try to capture underlying neural activity associated with model-derived 
predictive learning, the task was designed to be compatible with a functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) design, similarly to den Ouden et al. (2009). Using fMRI, I wanted 
to test the hypothesis that sensory predictions during TB could be associated with activation 
of structures central to reinforcement learning. A control condition to validate the occurrence 
of a real TB effect was not included in the experiment in order to maintain a reasonable time 
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frame for the freely volunteering participants and at the same time get adequate power for the 
fMRI measurements during the TB task. 
In this particular design it was considered important to have an equal number of button 
presses for each hand. The participants were therefore forced to use a fixed number of button 
presses during a given block of the task, which necessarily resulted in the last trial(s) in each 
block being completely forced, involving no freedom of choice. However, because of the 
blocked nature of the design, these few trials would be distributed across the experiment. It 
was assumed that the effect of these forced trials could be neglected with respect to the 
overall effect. 
Because it was thought to be the easiest and most reliable way of reporting subjective 
time duration while introducing trial-to-trial randomness in interval lengths, the reproduction 
procedure of Poonian and Cunnington (2013) was chosen as the method to measure TB. 
Slightly diverging from this procedure, it was additionally chosen to correct for variance in 
actual duration and compute an estimate of the relative binding for each trial. This was partly 
motivated by theoretical considerations of isolating what was thought to be the relevant 
component of the judgment error, but also because it previously has been shown that these 
absolute errors increase with interval length when using a direct estimation procedure 
(Humphreys & Buehner, 2009). 
1.4 Current hypotheses 
It was hypothesised that an increased prediction regarding stimulus-identity would be 
associated with increased TB, as evidenced by a shortening of the reported interval durations 
relative to the actual durations. It is further suspected that the prediction level will interact 
with the actual stimulus outcome such that an increased level of prediction error will be 
associated with a decrease in TB. 
Further, it is suspected that such prediction error-induced learning involves activation 
of neuroanatomical regions which are also known to be involved in classic reinforcement 
learning. By investigating neural correlates of the same model-derived expectancy/surprise 
values, it is sought to provide indirect evidence for such involvement. Specifically, it is 
hypothesised that increased levels of surprise will be associated with activation of striatum 
and certain regions of the visual cortex (because of the surprising feature being visual). 
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2 Methods 
2.1 Participants 
A total of 32 healthy volunteers participated in the current study. None of them 
reported any ongoing neurological or psychiatric disorder and all had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, including normal colour-vision. Participants were either 1
st
 year psychology 
students or students in other disciplines. They were all informed about their right to leave the 
study at any time and gave written consent before entering the scan room. A standard MRI 
safety procedure was also performed for all participants before scanning. 
Because of a programming error resulting in a failure to separate left and right button 
presses in the analysis for the first 8 participants, these participants had to be excluded from 
the current study. An additional 6 participants did not complete the interval estimation task, 
either because of too slow responding or misunderstanding of the task instructions. 1 
participant also aborted the task because of concerns with the scanner noise. This left me with 
complete datasets from a total of 17 individuals (8 male) ranging from 20 to 31 years of age 
(mean = 22.47; SD = 3.50). 
2.2 Design 
 The current study was designed around 3 factors. Evolving prediction (prediction: 
factor 1) was defined according to button press (cue: factor 2) acting as a cue for the identity 
of the stimulus outcome (outcome: factor 3), which is further providing information to update 
the prediction. The prediction could vary continuously between 0 and 1, while cue and 
outcome each had two distinct levels. The cue could be either colour- or grey-predictive, 
while the outcome could be either colour or grey. Importantly, this allowed me to characterise 
TB and neural activity associated with prediction given the cue, as well as the interaction 
between outcome and prediction given the cue, resulting in characterisation of surprise and 
expectancy, or increasing and decreasing levels of prediction error. 
2.2.1 Interval estimation task 
As will also be evident from the task instructions below, participants were presented 
with a fixation point displayed at the centre of the screen throughout the experiment. This 
point changed between being a vertical-horizontal cross and a simple horizontal bar. When 
the participants pressed one of the buttons, a circle followed after a uniform randomly chosen 
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interval between 500 and 1500 ms and was then presented for 500 ms. Apart from being 
central to the task, this random duration prevented the participants from estimating the exact 
onset of the stimulus (temporal control) and added an additional jitter which is of advantage to 
later fMRI analysis. After participants had tried to reproduce the interval by again pressing 
down the button, the fixation bar appeared upon releasing of the button. A jittered interval 
(uniform) between 1000 and 4000 ms was then added before the start of a new trial was 
marked by the reappearance of the fixation cross, indicating that a new button press could be 
made (fig. 2). 
The task was further divided into blocks, a total of 10, wherein participants had to use 
a total of 20 left and 20 right button presses. The remaining presses for the left and right 
button were continuously displayed in the upper left and right corners of the screen, 
respectively. If a button was pressed after all its available presses had been used, a message 
was displayed at the screen telling the participant to press the other button. Between each 
block, there was a short break of 12 seconds where only the fixation bar was displayed. At the 
start of the next block, the counters reappeared, displaying the number 20 in each corner. The 
task was further divided into two separate scan sessions, containing 5 blocks each, in order to 
give participants a short break before continuing. The whole task comprised 400 trials of 
interval estimations, 200 for each action cue. 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of one trial of the task. Fixation cross indicates that a button press 
should be made and fixation bar serves as a signal to wait. Counters in the upper corners 
denotes remaining left and right presses for the current block. Bottom text describes the 
duration of each frame. Proportions are not identical to the actual presentation (fixation 
points and numbers have been resized and adjusted for illustration purposes). 
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2.2.2 Stimuli and task-irrelevant probabilistic associations 
As with no relevance for participants in their given task, the circles resulting from a 
button press were either completely grey or coloured. However, left and right button presses 
were programmed in such a way that each caused a different amount of grey or coloured 
circles in each block. Specifically, one button resulted in 80 % coloured stimuli and 20 % 
grey, while the other button produced the exact opposite pattern (fig. 3). Thus, the stimulus 
identity was highly contingent on the specific button that was pressed. The proportion of grey 
to coloured stimuli was fixed for each block, having one button always result in 16 colour and 
4 grey circles and the other button getting the exact opposite distribution of stimuli. The order 
of colour and grey was randomised for each button. Importantly, and as an effect of the two 
action-outcome contingencies mirroring each other, there was an equal amount of both stimuli 
in each block, implying button press type as the only available predictor of stimulus identity. 
To minimise any bias of left and right presses on TB, the buttons contingent on colour and 
grey was switched across subjects, resulting in 9 participants having the right button 
contingent on colour and the 8 other having the right contingent on grey. 
 
 Button 1 (B1) Button 2 (B2) 
C
o
lo
u
r 
(C
) 
40 % 10 % 
G
re
y
 (
G
) 
10 % 40 % 
p(C|B1) = 80 % p(C|B2) = 20 % 
p(G|B1) = 20 % p(G|B2) = 80 % 
 
Figure 3. Contingency table, showing proportion of trials in each block displaying coloured 
or grey stimuli contingent on the pressing of either of two buttons. Which of button 1 or 2 that 
was assigned to right or left, differed between participants. 
 
As colour and grey stimuli I chose colour and luminance-matched greyscale wheels 
similar to the kind used in fMRI-adapted versions of the Farnsworth-Munsell 100 Hue Test 
(Beauchamp et al., 1999). Because I was interested in specific stimulus-identity prediction, 
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and not a more abstract prediction of colour, only one colour wheel was created for each 
participant. The wheel was created as a standard RGB colour wheel where colours changed 
gradually from red to green to blue and back to red, in clockwise direction. This colour 
stimulus was then converted to a grey-scale representation of its luminance via an in-built 
Matlab function (fig. 4). The stimuli were not adjusted according to subjectively perceived 
differences in luminance because it was regarded essential that the stimuli were novel at the 
start of the estimation task, to hinder any influence on the subsequent potential learning 
process. Further, the aim of the experiment was not to study colour processing per se, so the 
possibility of some activation being due to perceived luminance differences would not be of 
importance for the current questions. Following Beauchamp et al. (1999), the size of the 
wheels were adjusted such that they extended from ~ 1° to ~ 4° of the subjects’ field of view 
according to the central fixation point, because this was presumed to be the part of the retina 
with the highest density of cones. Across participants, three different variations of the colour 
and corresponding grey stimuli were used, one starting with red at the 12 o’clock position 
(fig. 4), and the other two stimuli starting with red at 4 and 8 o’clock, respectively. This 
resulted in 5, 6, and 6 participants having the respective stimulus variations, and it was done 
to hinder any bias resulting from the specific orientation of the stimuli. 
 
 
Figure 4. One set of colour and luminance-matched grey-scale wheels that was used as 
stimuli in the task. Three differently rotated sets of stimuli were created, and one set was 
assigned to each participant. 
2.3 Procedure 
2.3.1 Task instructions 
When volunteering, all participants were told that the aim of the study was to 
investigate judgments of time and neural activity associated with this phenomenon. When 
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arriving at the test location, they were given more detailed task instructions. They were told 
that a fixation point would appear at the screen they would later be watching, and that this 
point would change between being a simple bar and a cross. When the fixation bar would be 
shown they should just wait for the fixation cross. When the cross appeared, they were 
supposed to press either a left or a right button. They were told to wait for the cross and then 
make a spontaneous choice to press either left or right. Additional importance was placed on 
them not responding in any stereotyped way or adhering to any specific pattern. An example 
of such a pattern was given as simply alternating between left and right button presses. 
Further, they were told that a circle would soon appear after their button press, and that their 
task then was to estimate the elapsed time between these two events. The perceived time was 
to be reported immediately by again pressing down the button and holding it down for as long 
as they thought the interval duration had been. They could then make another button press 
when the fixation cross again appeared. Importantly, they were not informed about the 
specific properties of the circles, or the fact that all circles would not be identical. They were 
neither told anything about the specific durations of the intervals, except that they would be 
rather short. They were additionally told that the task would be divided into separate blocks 
and that for each block they would only be allowed to press each button 20 times. Counters in 
the upper left and right corners of the screen would provide them information on the amount 
of button presses left for each button. They were told that this provided them with a 
possibility to check how many presses they had left, but that it was otherwise not something 
they needed to pay attention to. 
2.3.2 Overall procedure 
After being given instructions and having completed the safety procedure, the 
participants were placed in the scanner. They then performed the time estimation task being 
reported on here. This was divided into two separate sessions, lasting ~ 20 minutes each. 
Between sessions, scanning was paused and the participants were told that there would now 
be another session with the exact same task that was equal in length to the previous. After 
completion of this task, they were told to rest while structural images were acquired, lasting ~ 
8 minutes. A second task, not reported on here, was then given to them before they were 
brought out from the scanner. This task lasted ~ 15 minutes, resulting in a total of ~ 1 hour 
effective scan time. After scanning, they all completed a short (27-item) questionnaire, which 
is also not reported on here. They were all then asked about the statistical associations during 
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the task, specifically whether they noticed that a colour circle would appear more often than a 
grey circle after pressing one of the buttons and vice versa for the other button. 
2.4 Stimulus presentation and data acquisition 
2.4.1 Behavioural data 
All stimuli were generated and presented, and behavioural data collected, using the 
Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 1997) 
implemented in MATLAB R2012b (MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA) running on a Dell 
Precision T7600. The stimuli were displayed in a mirrored fashion on a 32”, 60 Hz (input 
rate), MR-compatible screen (NNL LCD Monitor®, NordicNeuroLab, Bergen, Norway) 
placed behind the scanner bore. Participants then watched the screen through a mirror 
attached to the scanner head-coil. The task was triggered by a pulse from the scanner at the 
beginning of the fMRI acquisition, synchronising image acquisition with the task. Task 
responses were given using a set of MR-compatible grips (ResponseGrip®, NordicNeuroLab, 
Bergen, Norway), one in each hand, with a button that could be pressed using the index 
fingers. 
2.4.2 Imaging data 
Brain images were acquired using a Philips Achieva 3 Tesla MRI scanner with an 8-
channel Philips SENSE head coil (Philips Medical Systems, Best, The Netherlands). 
Functional imaging data were collected using a BOLD-sensitive T2*-weighted echo-planar 
imaging sequence. 34 transversally oriented slices (no gap) were acquired  (repetition time 
(TR), 2 s; echo time (TE), 30 ms; flip-angle, 80°; voxel size, 3 × 3 × 3; field of view (FOV), 
240 × 240 mm; interleaved acquisition). The FOV was placed such that both the entire visual 
and frontal cortex was covered. When larger brain size made this impossible, the most 
superior part of the cortex (around primary motor/sensory cortices) was left out of the FOV. 6 
dummy scans were acquired and discarded before the start of each scan session to avoid T1-
saturation effects. The duration of each session varied depending on the speed of that 
participants button presses from trial to trial, resulting in some variation in the amount of 
volumes collected. Structural images, consisting of 180 sagittally oriented slices, were 
acquired using a standard T1-weighted sequence (TR, 8.415 ms; TE, 3.90 ms; flip angle 8°; 
voxel size 1 × 1 × 1 mm; FOV, 256 × 256 mm). 
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2.5 Data analysis 
 All calculations and analyses were performed using Matlab R2011a. If not stated 
differently, statistics were estimated using the implemented Statistics Toolbox (version 7.5). 
2.5.1 Learning model 
In estimating trial-wise stimulus-identity predictions, I chose to use the Rescorla-
Wagner (RW) model (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), a simple associative learning model, 
because of apparent previous success in modelling task-irrelevant learning (den Ouden et al., 
2009). For the current purposes, this could be expressed simply as (adapted from den Ouden 
et al., 2009): 
 
           (    ) 
 
where the stimulus prediction ϕ gets updated on each trial t according to its discrepancy to the 
actual outcome λ, or in other words, the prediction error. The amount of updating is given by 
the learning rate ε. This model concerns updating of ϕ in the context of one specific cue where 
the cue always is identical in terms of saliency. In the original model an additional term is 
included to denote cue salience. However, this is not relevant for the current study, since the 
specific cues are always identical. 
 For each subject here, there were to cues, left and right button press, which could be 
used to predict whether the subsequent stimulus would be coloured or grey. Predictions were 
thus calculated separately for each cue, using the above RW equation. Based on the findings 
of den Ouden et al. (2009), a learning rate of 0.075 was used. For convenience regarding later 
inferences on the relationship between TB and expectancy/surprise, the outcome of one cue 
was defined as the opposite to the outcome of the other. For the cue that had a high 
probabilistic association to colour, colour was defined as a positive outcome in the model. 
Thus, the predictions associated with this cue were modelled as colour predictions. For the 
other cue, the predictions were stated in terms of predictions regarding grey. The result of this 
was two learning curves (fig. 5) with increasing predictions in the early trials, later stabilising 
with variations around the actual probabilistic contingencies of 0.8. 
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Figure 5. Example of prediction values calculated for one participant, defined as prediction 
regarding colour (blue) or grey (green) depending on the cue that was present on the trial. 
2.5.2 Behavioural analysis 
From the participants’ trial-wise estimations of interval duration, the corresponding 
TB values were calculated as the estimated interval duration subtracted from the true interval 
duration. The true interval was defined as the elapsed time from button press to stimulus 
presentation (onset time), while the estimated interval was defined as the time from button 
press to button release. In order to make the binding values less dependent on variations in 
actual length, in slight deviation from previous reports (Poonian & Cunnington, 2013), I 
further calculated relative TB (rTB) values as the proportion of estimation error to the actual 
interval length: 
 
     
                              
            
 
 
This transformation was done for each response, and the resulting rTB is used as the 
dependent variable in all subsequent analysis, effectively controlling for TB variation due to 
actual interval variation. 
As a further step in preparing the data for analysis, I tried to identify obvious statistical 
outliers due to the button being pressed for an abnormally short or long period of time. Since 
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significant variability in time judgments are expected and considered highly relevant during 
this task, only data points considered to be extreme outliers were removed from the data set 
before analysis. This was simply defined as any values more than 4 standard deviations from 
the mean, resulting in a total of 7 rejected data points or a total data loss of 0.10 %. 
Some assumptions regarding the data were then tested. First, a mean rTB score was 
produced for each participant and subjected to a one-sample t-test to test for relative 
estimation errors being significantly different from null, and skewed in the expected direction 
in terms of the classic TB effect. Second, to test whether participants were actually able to 
perform the task as expected, I estimated the correlation between real and estimated interval 
for each subject. 
In order to avoid a possible non-linear confound with time, the trials containing the 
initial rise in prediction values, as the associations are learnt, were discarded from further 
behavioural analysis. To achieve this, I identified the first trial where the prediction had 
reached the actual probabilistic association of 0.8 and analysed only the following trials for 
that cue. The same was done for the other cue. Thus, only variations in prediction level after 
the subject had presumably reached the accurate prediction level was analysed in terms of 
corresponding rTB variation. The average first trial reaching prediction ≥ 0.8 was 80.74 (SD = 
16.31). 
In estimating the potential contributions of prediction and prediction error as 
predictors of variability in TB, I used an approach similar to that of Browning and Harmer 
(2012), running separate regression models for each subject and using the resulting beta 
values for later population inference. A general linear model regression analysis was set up 
individually including regressors of interest and other potentially influencing variables as 
additional regressors. Of particular interest for the current research questions was the 
interaction between the trial-specific prediction value and the actual outcome with respect to 
that prediction (prediction × surprise). Depending on the outcome, increasing prediction 
values would represent either increasing surprise or increasing expectancy. Assuming a linear 
relationship between the predictor and observed response, this interaction term allows testing 
for the existence of such a relationship, as well as the direction of influence. The components 
of this interaction (prediction and surprise) were included as separate regressors to account 
for any additional main effects. The surprise component is thus defined as surprising with 
respect to the prediction given by the cue. Further, attempting to control for other relevant 
factors, time, condition, and outcome were included as additional regressors. Time was 
modelled here as a linear increase with trial number. Condition was defined as cue type 
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(associated with colour vs. grey). Outcome defined the actual identity of the outcome (colour 
vs. grey). See supplementary table 1 in the appendix, for an overview of the included 
regressors with explanations and definitions. 
2.5.3 Learning rate optimisation 
A weakness in the currently used learning model is that the optimal learning rate 
during this task in unknown. Since the behavioural and imaging data are statistically 
independent, it was therefore reasoned that the former could be used as a source for 
optimising the learning model to be used in analysis of the latter. I therefore ran several 
regression models for each subject, using incremental learning rates from 0.001 to 0.15 in 
steps of 0.001 and chose the model with the largest squared t value for the 
surprise/expectancy interaction (prediction × surprise) as the one representing the best fit with 
TB values according to results from the group-level behavioural analysis. However, this 
produced highly variable results in terms of optimised learning rate (SD = 0.05), as well as 
some subjects (N = 5) then showing a positive prediction × surprise interaction (at odds with 
group behavioural results, see Results section). In order to preserve comparability between 
behavioural and neural analysis, the initial model with learning rate of 0.075 for all subjects 
was therefore kept as the best approximation of learning for the group as a whole.  
2.5.4 fMRI preprocessing 
All preprocessing and analysis of fMRI data were performed using SPM8 (Wellcome 
Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) implemented 
in MATLAB R2011a. To prepare the data for analysis, image coordinates were manually 
adjusted for each subject so that the origin were set to the anterior commissure (AC) with its 
axial plane further intersecting the posterior commissure (PC) defining the “Talairach space“ 
(Poldrack et al., 2008), recommended as the starting point for later automated adjustments on 
the data. The data were then slice-time corrected, adjusting each image slice for differences in 
acquisition time (Sladky et al., 2011). A realignment procedure was then run to estimate and 
correct for movement between the acquired volumes (Andersson, Hutton, Ashburner, Turner, 
& Friston, 2001). The movement parameters were inspected for excessive movement, and 
none of the subjects were excluded from analysis on this basis. I then coregistered the 
structural T1 image to the mean image of the already aligned functional EPI’s. Successful 
coregistration was checked by visually inspecting the images match when overlaying the 
functional images on the structural for each subject. The images were then normalised into 
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MNI (Montreal Neurological Institute) space by first running a segmentation procedure on the 
structural image, creating normalisation parameters for that particular subject, before applying 
those parameters to all of that subjects coregistered functional images. The images were re-
written as normalised images using their original voxel size of 3 × 3 × 3. As a last 
preprocessing step, the normalised functional images were smoothed, using a kernel of 8 × 8 
× 8 full-width half-maximum (FWHM) (Mikl et al., 2008), in order to improve signal-to-noise 
ratio (e.g. Triantafyllou, Hoge, & Wald, 2006). 
2.5.5 fMRI analysis 
2.5.5.1 Learning analysis 
The fMRI-data were analysed as an event-related design using the general linear 
model (Friston, 1994), creating separate regressors for each trial type which are then 
convolved with the hemodynamic response function (Friston, Josephs, Rees, & Turner, 1998). 
The data were high-pass filtered to remove slow signal drifts, using a cut-off set to 128 s. 
Remaining serial correlations were modelled using a first-order autoregressive model (Friston 
et al., 2002). 
For each trial in the experiment, there were 2 relevant variables (cue and outcome) 
with 2 levels each (colour-predictive/grey-predictive and colour/grey), which resulted in 4 
possible ways of defining a given trial, and thus initially 4 different regressors in the design 
matrix. These regressors were defined according to the onset times of the outcomes on each 
trial. For the current research question, I was however only interested in neural activity 
associated with the hypothesised stimulus-learning previously tested for using the behavioural 
data. Following this investigation, I used the set of prediction values previously described 
with predictions defined according to the cue, resulting in two sets of approximately parallel 
learning curves, one denoting colour prediction and the other grey prediction. These values 
were then used as input in the analysis as parametric modulators (PM) for their respective 
regressors. Specifically, the outcomes of the button press (cue) that predicted colour was 
modulated by trial-specific levels of colour prediction and the outcomes of the other cue was 
modulated by grey prediction levels, defined separately for each cue-outcome combination. In 
this way, the PM of each regressor would capture activity associated with either increasing 
levels of expectancy or increasing levels of surprise for the outcome given the cue (fig. 6). 
This was then analysed further in a second-level analysis. Each PM was further expanded by a 
2
nd
 order polynominal to account for some additional non-linearity, making the model less 
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dependent on the learning rate of 0.075 as well as between-subject variability in the shape of 
the learning curve (den Ouden et al., 2009). Using simple condition-specific t-contrasts of the 
PM and PM expansion from each subject, I performed a group-level analysis using a 2 (cue: 
colour-predictive vs. grey-predictive) × 2 (outcome: colour vs. grey) repeated-measures 
ANOVA with an added subject-factor. With the PM’s as input, this was effectively testing for 
the 3-way interaction of prediction × cue × outcome, showing either activity related to 
surprise or expectancy depending on the direction of the interaction. 
 
 
Figure 6. The predictions defined as PMs according to the four different regressors. The PMs 
capture activity associated with variation in expectancy and surprise for each outcome. 
 
In order to maximise the chance of finding any true activation in the data, I used 
anatomically restricted search-volumes based on previous knowledge. Following den Ouden 
et al. (2009), I expected prediction error related activity in colour-sensitive areas in the 
occipital cortex as well as putamen and possibly also caudate nucleus. For a learning response 
independent of outcome, the right inferior frontal gyrus was also included as a candidate area. 
The Talairach Daemon atlas (Lancaster et al., 2000) within the WFU PickAtlas toolbox 
(version 2.4) (Maldjian, Laurienti, Kraft, & Burdette, 2003) in SPM was used to create a mask 
containing these regions. The entire occipital cortex was included to account for multiple 
colour-sensitive areas (Beauchamp et al., 1999) as well as other perceived differences 
between the stimuli (e.g. perceived luminance) that was not controlled for in the task. Using 
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activation maps thresholded by p < 0.005 with a 10 voxel extent (Lieberman & Cunningham, 
2009), I then performed a small-volume correction (SVC) (Poldrack, 2007) using this mask 
for the interaction contrasts. For each subject, a t contrast was also defined for the main effect 
of the PMs. This was then subjected to a one-sample t test to test for a main effect of 
prediction regardless of outcome. Age, gender, and handedness were entered as covariates. 
The same SVC was then also performed on this group activation map. 
2.5.5.2 Comparative analysis and re-analysis based on SUIT normalisation 
Since a recent study has investigated neural correlates of TB resulting from a direct 
estimation task (Kühn et al., 2013), this was used as an opportunity to compare results from 
the current data set. By comparing TB-related activation during the current task with the 
previous findings, this would give an indication to both the validity of the task as reflecting 
true TB as well as the validity of the fMRI design in characterising the underlying neural 
signal. I therefore proceeded by using the previously described preprocessed images in a new 
analysis. For this analysis, only 2 regressors were used, one for each button press type (right 
vs. left), and all onset times were redefined to the button press onset, following Kühn et al. 
(2013). The rTB values were now entered as PMs for their respective regressors. Otherwise, 
all of the first-level settings were identical to the previously described analysis. Group-level 
activation was tested for using a one-sample t-test on individually defined contrasts specifying 
activation associated with increase and decrease in rTB. Age, gender and handedness were 
included as covariates. A mask was defined for supplementary motor area (SMA) using the 
WFU PickAtlas to test for a replication of the results of Kühn et al. (2013). 
Because I found indications of upper brain-stem activity during this comparative 
analysis (see Results), I wanted to run an extra procedure to better characterise its probable 
anatomical location. Because the regular normalisation method used by SPM has been found 
to do a poor job of normalising the cerebellum and brain-stem areas (Diedrichsen, 2006), I 
normalised the previously realigned and coregistered images again using the SUIT toolbox in 
SPM, which is based on a spatially unbiased template of the cerebellum and brain-stem 
(Diedrichsen, 2006; Diedrichsen, Balsters, Flavell, Cussans, & Ramnani, 2009; Diedrichsen et 
al., 2011). Because the level of smoothing can affect the ability to localise the inferred 
activation (e.g. Geissler et al., 2005), I also used a reduced smoothing kernel of 6 × 6 × 6 
FWHM before analysing these images again using the above described design. 
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3 Results 
When asked whether they noticed that the colour stimulus showed up more frequently 
after pressing one of the buttons and that grey showed up more often after the other button 
press, 3 participants said they noticed it, 2 said that they had wondered about it at some point 
during the experiment, and the remaining 12 said they had not noticed it at all. 
3.1 Behaviour 
The subjects’ average rTB values show that the intervals are judged as significantly 
shorter than the real interval lengths at the group-level (t(16) = 3.47, p = 3.17 × 10
-3
)  with a 
group-average rTB value of 0.16 (SE = 0.05) in line with the TB effect. However, it should 
also be noted that 3 participants actually had negative average rTB values, on average judging 
the intervals as longer than their actual lengths. The correlations between estimated and real 
intervals were positive and significant for all participants, indicating at least decent 
performance of the task. However, performance in this respect was also highly variable (r 
between 0.20 (p = 6.16 × 10
-5
) and 0.75 (p = 5.10 × 10
-73
); meanr = 0.53; SDr = 0.16). 
From analysing the betas from the individual regression analyses, the interaction 
between prediction value and surprising outcome was found to be significant across the group 
(prediction × surprise:  t(16) = -2.67, puncorr =0.02). The nature of this interaction was 
negative, such that higher prediction values are predictive of lower TB values when the 
outcome is surprising with respect to that prediction. Additionally, whether the outcome was 
surprising was found to be an additionally significant predictor across subjects (surprise: t(16) 
= 2.65, puncorr = 0.02). Also, time was found to be a significant predictor (time; t(16)= -3.11, 
puncorr = 0.007). Accounting for multiple comparisons across the 6 predictors of interest using 
a positive false discovery rate (pFDR) estimation (Storey, 2002) yields acceptable values (< 
0.05) for all above p values. 
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Figure 7. Bar plots showing average beta weights across the group. Error bars indicate 
standard errors of the mean. 
3.2 fMRI 
3.2.1 Learning analysis 
No significant activation was found for the 3-way interaction prediction × cue × 
outcome using the anatomically defined mask for SVC (pFWE < 0.05). A whole-brain search 
was then performed, checking for significant activation surviving a family-wise error (FWE) 
rate of 0.05, when thresholded at p < 0.005 and k > 10 (Lieberman & Cunningham, 2009). 
Still, no activation was identified, not even when setting the significance level to puncorr = 
0.001 (k > 20). I did an additional check of this finding by taking individually defined t 
contrasts for surprise compared with expectancy and running a one-sample t test for the 
group. This resulted in a similar null finding (for puncorr = 0.001, k > 20). Additionally, no 
activation was found for the 2-way interactions prediction × cue or prediction × outcome 
using SVC (pFWE < 0.05) or whole brain FWE of 0.05. The one-sample t test on the main 
effect of prediction revealed no activation either, again using the same two approaches to 
correct for multiple comparisons. 
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3.2.2 Comparative analysis 
The SMA ROI showed activation associated with neither increase nor decrease in 
rTBs. I therefore checked the same contrasts at the whole-brain level thresholded at p < 0.005 
and k > 10. For the positive correlation with rTBs, still no activity was found to be significant. 
However, for the negative correlation, that is, activation associated with decreasing rTBs 
(longer estimations, when corrected for actual interval length), two clusters were identified as 
significant at the cluster level (pFWE = 9.74 × 10
-3
 and pFWE = 2.86 × 10
-5
). The largest cluster 
(k = 391) was located in the precuneus (peak MNI -18, -52, 31) and the other cluster (k = 170) 
with peak-activation in the left upper brain-stem (MNI -15, -22, -11) extending further to the 
left hippocampus (fig. 8). Acknowledging the fact that the extent of the second cluster is 
anatomically improbable, and at best contains several overlapping clusters, it was still 
considered worthwhile to take a closer look at the anatomical location of the peak, even 
though the peak itself was not significant after correcting for multiple comparison (pFWE = 
0.37, Z = 4.27). 
Although no activity survived correction for multiple comparisons for the positive 
correlation with rTBs, the uncorrected t map was indicative of a potentially activated network 
(see supplementary fig. 1, Appendix). 
 
 
Figure 8.  The two significant activation clusters identified for a decrease in rTBs. The 
activation map is overlaid on a standard MNI template (colin27). Colour bar denotes t 
values. puncorr < 0.005 for illustration purpose. 
 
3.2.2.1 Re-analysis after SUIT normalisation 
After re-analysing the data after improved normalisation and less smoothing, the peak 
was more specifically located at MNI -16, -25, -6 (puncorr = 1.41 × 10
-5
, Z = 4.19) and 
activation was found to overlap partly with the substantia nigra (fig. 9) as defined using WFU 
PickAtlas. 
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Figure 9. (A) Brain-stem activation (puncorr = 0.001) after re-analysing the data using the 
SUIT normalisation procedure and (B) partly overlap between activation cluster (red) and 
atlas definition of substantia nigra (yellow). Activation and atlas definition are overlaid on a 
group-averaged T1 image resulting from isolating and normalising the brain-stem and 
cerebellum in SUIT. 
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4 Discussion 
4.1 Predictive learning and TB 
Contrasting with earlier claims (Desantis et al., 2012), I here provide evidence that TB 
is indeed affected by stimulus-specific predictions. The outcomes were displayed with equal 
frequencies across blocks during the experiment, so the only way for participants to predict 
specific outcomes (and get surprised by violations) was to use the action as cue. The 
comparison between the learning model and behavioural data further suggests that the 
surprising stimuli result in decreasing TB with increasing predictions regarding those stimuli. 
In other words, increased predictability results in increased binding if the stimulus matches 
the prediction and decreased binding if the stimulus violates the prediction. This is as 
hypothesised and matches an explanation of TB as resulting from a comparison between 
internal sensory predictions and externally generated sensations. There was also a trend in the 
data towards predictability having an effect on TB regardless of outcome, but this was not 
statistically significant. This could well be a result of the limited sample size used here, since 
other studies have shown binding when the probability of an effect is high regardless of 
outcome (Engbert & Wohlschläger, 2007). 
In spite of the indications from the behavioural data, I did not find any evidence of 
neural activation associated with expectancy or surprise during performance of the task. This 
could be due to lack of power in the fMRI design or a bad model fit due to the chosen 
learning rate. This last point is however not a sufficient explanation since it was found that 
this particular learning model had an influence on the TB measures. If this inference is 
correct, there should also be neural activity associated with the model. Because the attempt of 
individually optimising learning curves yielded non-consistent results, the behavioural results 
was considered being non-consistent across subjects. This indicated that some participants did 
not show any effect of expectancy/surprise on TB or that some might even show a different 
pattern than the majority of the group. Because of this, it was not considered possible to 
estimate individually tailored learning curves, and the initial learning model, showing a 
group-level fit, was therefore chosen. As a result of these rather weak results it might be that 
the effect in the behavioural data was too small to be picked up in the imaging data. 
The finding that surprising outcomes exert an effect on binding regardless of the 
specified prediction value, further suggests that the learning model has not sufficiently 
accounted for all prediction variability. Some of this lack of model fit could perhaps be 
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attributed to the non-optimal learning rate that was chosen or it might well be that the model 
is not sophisticated enough to account for all variability. As such, there seems to be potential 
for future research in working towards a better model of surprise-induced learning in TB. 
Additionally, the main effect of surprising outcomes is actually related to binding in a positive 
way. It contributes to an increase in binding. This is unexpected, since a match of outcome 
and sensory prediction has been thought to increase binding, and not the other way around. 
Similarly, the main effect of the prediction, even though non-significant, indicates a negative 
influence of prediction on TB. The mechanisms underlying the resulting interaction between 
prediction and surprising outcome may therefore also be different than initially hypothesised. 
It might even be that stimulus-specific surprise affects binding differently than surprise 
regarding the actual occurrence of any stimulus. This distinction might be the subject of future 
studies. 
In line with recent evidence, the findings here support a change in TB over time 
(Cravo, Haddad, Claessens, & Baldo, 2013). However, in contrast with those findings, the 
current data support a decrease in TB, or a general lengthening of judgments over time. This 
could be due to differences in measuring TB. 
4.2 Neural correlates of TB 
The failure to replicate the findings of Kühn et al. (2013) regarding SMA activation 
associated with TB and the identification of new neural patterns, places doubt on the 
assumption that we have been studying the same phenomenon. Apart from the components in 
the task, the only difference between our approaches was the method used to measure TB. 
This should therefore be given some further thought. Although both studies used a direct 
estimation procedure, Kühn et al. (2013) used the more common method of having the 
subjects report the interval using a scale. As previously noted, this necessarily involves a 
transformation of the experienced duration to some sort of number system in order to convey 
the experience, which at least intuitively could seem like a more complex task and thus 
possibly introduce more uncertainty, or even bias, in the measurements. The second 
difference between the two approaches pertains to the length and variation in the intervals that 
was used. I currently used continuously varying intervals, whereas Kühn et al. (2013) used 
only three distinct intervals. Further, the current intervals varied between 500 and 1500 ms, 
compared with intervals of 200, 300 or 400 ms in the previous study. This is of special 
importance since varying degrees of binding has been reported at different interval lengths   
under certain estimation methods (Humphreys & Buehner, 2009). In combination with the 
34 
 
previously described behavioural results contrasting with previous findings, this suggests that 
the methods used to measure TB may not measure the same phenomena. Therefore, future 
studies on phenomenological implications of these methodological differences are highly 
encouraged. 
The exact location of the brain-stem activation identified should be interpreted with 
extreme caution because of limited spatial resolution in the images as well as further 
smoothing of the signal during preprocessing. However, the peak activation appears close to 
the left substantia nigra. Since the involvement of this structure has been reported during a 
simple interval reproduction task similar to the one used here (Jahanshahi, Jones, Dirnberger, 
& Frith, 2006), it could be hypothesised that it plays a role beyond simple reproduction. The 
activation reported here does not describe reproduction per se, but instead the direction of 
reproduction error during the reproduction task. The brain-stem activity correlates negatively 
with shorter estimates, corrected for actual length. That is, the longer the temporal estimates 
relative to the actual length, the more activation there is. It seems unlikely that this activation 
should be related to a decrease in sense of agency. It is therefore assumed that this must be 
related to another aspect of the task, like the direction of reproduction error. 
Activation of the precuneus has previously been reported to be associated with 
attribution of action to another person compared with attribution to oneself (Farrer & Frith, 
2002). It has further been implied in the neural network associated with self-consciousness 
(Cavanna & Trimble, 2006). Perhaps most interestingly, this is a central node in the so-called 
‘default-mode network’ (Fransson & Marrelec, 2008; Raichle et al., 2001; Utevsky, Smith, & 
Huettel, 2014) which consistently shows deactivation during demanding tasks. If it is assumed 
that variations in rTB reflect variations in agency, it could certainly make sense that a 
decrease in agency could be linked to a task-deactivation node. If the non-significant 
activation pattern for the positive rTB contrast is used as a further indication (supplementary 
fig. 1, appendix), one could speculate that the positive association might represent activation 
of a network associated with attention or otherwise be a result of increased task-demand. 
Consistent with the speculation that this region is somehow involved in agency is the finding 
of abnormal connectivity in this area in schizophrenia (Bluhm et al., 2007) as well as failures 
of deactivation in the same patient group (Salgado-Pineda et al., 2011) and correlation with 
these patients’ positive symptoms (Garrity et al., 2007). 
 A study on patients with Parkinson’s disease also showed failure of task-related 
precuneus deactivation which was restored with use of dopaminergic medication (Delaveau et 
al., 2010). 
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 Since no control condition was included in the current study, there can be made no 
inference as to whether any of the observed activity is due to voluntary action specifically. It 
is therefore possible that none of the clusters might be specific to voluntary action. It is also 
possible that one of them is, whereas the other is due to some other aspect of the task. 
Because of the central function of the precuneus in the default mode network, I speculate that 
this activation reflects participants being less attentive to or involved in the task. If this is true, 
there might be an increased ‘binding baseline’ when attentional resources are directed at the 
task compared to when they are not. It would thus have been interesting to see a study 
investigating a potential modulating role of attention on binding. 
4.3 Limitations 
As previously mentioned, there is an important limitation in the current study in the 
exclusion of a control condition for non-specific voluntary action effects. Thus, the 
occurrence of a true TB effect can not be validated for the current task. 
The regression model that was used in the behavioural analysis assumed a linear 
relationship between predictors and outcome. This might of course be a false assumption, 
implying that the current division between interacting and specific contributions of prediction 
level and outcome might be a false dichotomy. Future studies might thus find evidence of 
more specific prediction-outcome relations for TB. The results are, nonetheless, indicative of 
an interaction between the participants stimulus-specific expectations and the nature of the 
outcome regarding that particular expectation. 
Because participants were given a cue (fixation cross) when they were allowed to 
press the button, their button press could be seen as partly reactive, not giving them the 
freedom to press at a time of their own choosing. They were, however, carefully instructed 
not to make a choice of which button to press before the fixation cross appeared, thus 
retaining a spontaneous choice (for all but the last trial(s) in each block). Stated differently, 
they were given the choice of which button to press, but not when to press it. It is likely that 
this is a somewhat different phenomenon than freely choosing when to act and could 
contribute to the current results contrasting with earlier findings. 
Further, because left and right counters were used in the task, it can be argued that the 
participants’ attention could be distracted away from the fixation point also during the task. 
However, it is unlikely that this would have a significant impact, because performance of the 
task necessitates attention towards the location where the stimulus will appear. 
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Since the intervals are all estimated retrospectively, we can’t know whether variations 
in TB are representing real perceptual errors or if it is due to memory and recollection 
processes. More fundamentally, we don’t know whether time judgments reflect the subjective 
experience of time. 
4.4 Future directions 
Based on the current findings, it could be argued for a central role for prediction error 
in affecting TB. The stimuli used here differed only in a rather minor way, by varying one 
simple feature. Even the highest value of prediction error obtained here could thus be 
regarded as quite small when considering that most of the prediction was always fulfilled (the 
stimulus was always a circle with the same pattern). It would therefore be interesting if future 
investigations would take into account such differences in prediction error. If a study is 
designed where the stimulus identity differs quantitatively with respect to how well it matches 
the prediction, such effects could be tested for. 
The failure to identify a neural prediction error response when such prediction error 
seems to affect the task, could provide a case for future work to investigate how TB could 
relate to neural hierarchical predictive coding, especially at lower levels involving basic 
perceptual processes. Since it has been suggested that TB reflects a ‘preconscious’ sense of 
agency that could be dissociated from the type of agency that one is consciously aware of and 
capable of reporting verbally, it would be particularly interesting to know if these processes 
are fundamentally different or whether they relate to similar principles operating at different 
hierarchical levels. Theoretical work on how predictive coding relates to agency and sensory 
attenuation has already emerged (Brown, Adams, Parees, Edwards, & Friston, 2013). 
As already mentioned, more work is encouraged on characterising the impact of 
methodological differences in measuring TB, especially how this relates to subjective 
experiences of motor control and sense of agency. Also, attempts should be made on 
replicating and extending previous findings regarding neural activity associated with binding, 
using different TB measures. 
4.5 Concluding remarks 
 The current study provides evidence that predictions of stimulus-specific features are 
learnt during action-effect interval estimation, and that these predictions do affect temporal 
judgments, even when completely task-irrelevant. It is concluded that the predictions affect 
temporal binding through an interaction with their respective outcomes, that is, through 
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prediction error. Specifically, such an increased prediction error leads to a decrease in 
binding. However, because the main effect of surprise here is predictive of an increase in TB, 
any conclusions of a general effect of prediction error can not be drawn from the current 
study. Even though no independent contribution of prediction level was found here, an 
independent role for stimulus-prediction regardless of outcome can not be ruled out. 
 There was not found any evidence of a neural prediction or prediction error response 
during this task, which leaves the question of how such learning is implemented in the brain 
still open. However, activation of the precuneus was found to be associated with decreased 
binding. I speculate that this might represent ‘default mode’ activation and that it might be a 
result of less resources being allocated towards processing of task-demands. Future studies are 
therefore encouraged to investigate a possible modulating effect of attention on binding.  
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6 Appendix 
Supplementary table 1. Definition of variables in the individual regression analyses on the 
behavioural data. 
Regressor name Variable type Explanation Definition 
time continuous Represents a linear 
increase in time 
according to number of 
trials performed. 
Trial-wise increasing 
numbers between 0 and 1. 
condition categorical, 
dichotomous 
Represents cue 
associated with colour 
outcome versus grey. 
Button press associated 
with colour is defined as 1. 
The other button press is 0. 
outcome categorical, 
dichotomous 
Actual outcome of the 
current button press in 
terms of colour or grey. 
Colour is defined as 1 and 
grey as 0. 
prediction continuous Stimulus-prediction 
regarding outcome. 
Defined with respect to 
colour for button press 
with high probabilistic 
association to colour and 
with respect to grey for the 
other button press. Trial-
specific values are 
estimated using the RW 
model. 
surprise categorical, 
dichotomous 
Surprising outcome with 
respect to current 
prediction. 
Surprising outcome is 
defined as 1 and expected 
outcome as 0. 
prediction × 
surprise 
continuous Interaction between 
current prediction level 
and the violation 
(surprise) or fulfilment 
(expectancy) of that 
prediction. 
Interaction term created by 
the element-wise 
multiplication of 
prediction and surprise 
regressors. 
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Supplementary figure 1. Indications of activity associated with increased rTB (uncorrected 
values). 
 
 
 
The figures are showing t-map (puncorr = 0.005, k > 10) with clusters that did not survive 
correction for multiple comparisons for the contrast showing positive correlation with rTB. 
Peak activations are located in middle frontal gyrus (MNI 42, 41, 13; puncorr = 5.11 × 10
-5
; Z = 
3.89), inferior frontal gyrus (MNI 48, 11, 7; puncorr = 3.07 × 10
-4
; Z = 3.43) extending into 
insula (MNI 33, 23, 1; puncorr = 1.26 × 10
-3
; Z = 3.02), middle cingulum (MNI 6, 26, 40; puncorr 
= 3.39 × 10
-4
; Z = 3.40), and inferior parietal lobe, (MNI 51, -46, 49; puncorr = 1.06 × 10
-3
; Z = 
3.07). Activation maps are overlaid on the colin27 template brain. 
 
 
 
 
